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Abstract: Using a three-year panel data set of rural households in the
Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, we examine the dynamics of poverty and
the impact of two intervention measures—the food for work (FFW) and the
food security package (FSP) programs—upon poverty by disaggregating total
poverty into its transient and chronic components. Poverty in the region is
predominantly chronic. Results of matching estimators indicate that the FSP
program has a significant negative effect on total and chronic poverty, but not
on transient poverty. Households involved in the program have on average
lower levels of total and chronic poverty than households not involved in the
program. The FFW on the other hand does not significantly influence any of
the three forms of poverty. Tertile regressions, however, reveal that the FFW
benefits households in the richest and the middle tertiles.
1. Introduction
Conventional poverty profile and poverty status measures provide useful
information on the level of poverty, characteristics of the poor and the poverty
correlates thereof. This, however, is not sufficient to combat poverty, partly
because the correlates of poverty profiles are different from the dynamic
process that determines a household’s movements into and out of poverty.
The lack of an inter-temporal dimension in the conventional measure is
one of its criticisms and its presence provides a useful insight into what
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determines movements into and out of poverty and why some households
remain poor.
The study of poverty dynamics requires panel data and the lack of it has
been the limiting factor to study poverty dynamics in developing countries
until recently. Over the last decade, a growing amount of panel data sets
for developing countries has enabled researchers to start addressing the
movements in poverty and the factors explaining these movements. Baulch
and Hoddinott (2000) bring together recent studies on poverty dynamics
in the developing world. In Ethiopia, several research papers (Dercon and
Krishnan, 2000; Bigsten and Shimeles, 2004; Dercon, 2005; Swanepoel,
2005) have analyzed the dynamics of poverty but none have looked at the
impact of intervention programs in place to fight poverty.
In the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, two intervention programs—
the food or cash for work (FFW) program and the household level food
security package (FSP) program—are widely implemented to fight poverty
and ensure food security. By engaging the rural poor in public works such
as the construction of rural roads, dams, and soil and water conservation
activities against payment either in cash or in kind, the FFW program
has a short-term objective of protecting the poor against shocks (consumption
smoothing) as well as a long-term objective of poverty reduction, growth
enhancement and natural resource conservation. The household level FSP
program on the other hand intends to secure food at household level by
diversifying the income base of the poor through provision of resources
(credit) for a range of activities in a package. Identifying the basic interest
of the rural poor and providing the required resources, technical assistance
and training to engage in their choice of activities so as to secure food at
household level and sustain income over time is the prime concern of the
FSP program.
A number of empirical studies have been conducted about the FFW
program. Most focused on the efficiency in targeting (Clay et al., 1999;
Devereux, 1999; Ravallion, 1999; Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2000; Haddad
and Adato, 2001; Jayne et al., 2002) and others on the mode of payment—
cash versus food (Faminow, 1995; Dorosh and Haggblade, 1997; Arndt
and Tarp, 2001). Despite the importance of FFW programs to household
welfare, studies on the impact of the programs on welfare are limited. There
is a small body of research that assesses the impact of food aid programs on
household food security and welfare and to a more limited extent, nutrition
(Barrett, 2002). Important exceptions include Quisumbing (2003), Dercon
and Krishnan (2004), Yamano et al. (2005) and Holden et al. (2006). In a
recent paper, Gilligan and Hoddinott (2007) examined the importance of
FFW on consumption, food security and assets in rural Ethiopia.
Given the objectives of the programs—smoothing consumption in the
short run and lifting income of participants in the long run—the evaluation of
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the impact of these programs upon chronic and transient poverty is pertinent,
an aspect which has never been studied before. Using a panel data set of 385
rural households in northern Ethiopia, we assess the level of chronic and
transitory poverty and the importance of the FFW and FSP programs for the
chronically poor and transiently poor households. The paper is organized as
follows. In the section that follows, we briefly describe intervention programs
in Tigray. Data and methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4
discusses the dynamics of poverty by identifying the magnitude of poverty
and the impact of FFW and FSP programs on chronic and transient poverty
and Section 5 concludes.
2. Intervention Programs in Tigray
Tigray is the northernmost state of Ethiopia. It is one of the most drought
prone and food insecure regions. Tackling food security at household
level, which stretches from making food available to the rural poor to
mitigate transitory economic shocks through emergency relief and safety
net mechanisms, to diversifying the income base of the poor, is arguably
the most effective and direct way of poverty reduction envisaged by the
government. Among the programs implemented for this purpose are the
Food for Work (FFW)1 and an integrated household level extension program
known as the Food Security Package (FSP) programs.
The FFW program has a long history in Ethiopia. It was first used in
public works programs in the early 1960s. During the 1980s, the government
managed an extensive national FFW soil conservation and afforestation
project using labor brigades (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2000). Today, FFW
serves as a safety net for poor communities in food insecure areas. Poor
households are made to work in public projects such as in the construction
of rural roads for food wage. It is a way of utilizing the food aid available to
development ends, while at the same time transferring food to the poor, that
is, a transition between emergency relief and the achievement of long-term
development objectives.
FFW projects envisaged until 2004 were more focused on a relief-oriented
emergency system. Food insecurity in Ethiopia is normally understood in
terms of recurrent food crises and famines, and responses to food insecurity
have conventionally been dominated by emergency food based interventions
(Devereux et al., 2006). However, a significant portion of the aid recipients
or those engaged in the FFW projects are not simply poor but chronically
food insecure. Given their resource constraints and overall level of poverty,
their food deficiencies are predictable which requires long-term predictable
support. Recognizing this, in 2004 a Productive Safety Net Program
(PSNP) was introduced in Ethiopia. It marked a shift from a relief-oriented
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emergency system to a productive and development-oriented safety net.
The program’s objectives are to smooth household consumption by bridging
production deficits in chronically food insecure farming households, protect
household assets as a result of distress sales and create community assets
(Devereux et al., 2006). The program increasingly provides cash rather
than food support through labor intensive public works that address the
underlying causes of food insecurity and through grants to households who
cannot undertake public works (MoARD, 2004). Here, we do not make a
distinction between the FFW program before 2005 and the PSNP since 2005.
We consider both as FFW.
Besides the FFW program, the household level food security package
(FSP) program was introduced in Tigray with the objective of furnishing the
asset base of the poor to ensure food security and to increase and diversify
the income base through the provision of adequate and efficient financial
services, training and technical assistance. The program was launched in
November 2002 with the overall aim of improving the livelihood of the
rural households and raising the average annual income to ETB18,000 per
household in a period of three years (Mirutse et al., 2006).2
The household level FSP is a coordinated program that involves the main
actors in the rural development of the region, mainly the regional Bureau of
Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD), the Food Security Office and
the Dedebit Credit and Saving Institute (DECSI), the locally operating micro
finance institute. Individual households capable of using loans for productive
purposes are eligible for the program. A household can get financed for a
range of activities (package) and loans are disbursed on an individual basis.
Although the components of the package for which loans are granted differ
from area to area to suit agro-ecological and other factors, the basic ones
include livestock (oxen and cows), small animals (sheep and goats), poultry,
beehives, seed and fertilizer. Depending on the type of activity, loan periods
range from 2 to 4 years.
As measures to reduce poverty, the FFW and the FSP programs need be
evaluated in terms of their short-term and long-term objectives. The short-
run question is the ability of the programs (especially the FFW program) to
effectively shield people who suffer transition income shocks. In this regard,
when poor households face temporary shocks, they will have access to food
in an exchange for their labor service in public works. This helps the poor not
only to have the minimum essential quantity of food necessary to maintain
good nutrition, but also protects them from losing their meager assets. Thus,
the short-run objectives of the programs need to be evaluated in their ability
to reduce transitory poverty.
Besides the transitorily poor, there are also the chronically poor households
who are poor most of the time. The chronic poor are believed to have a low
level of asset base to generate income. Thus, the long-run objective of the
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FFW and the FSP programs to reduce poverty is evaluated in their ability
to foster income growth and wealth accumulation among the chronically
destitute, that is, in their ability to reduce chronic poverty.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
The data considered here have been collected in three consecutive years—
2004, 2005 and 2006—in four study tabias3 in northern Ethiopia using
a two-stage sampling design. The primary sampling units were tabias.
Sample tabias were selected on the basis of secondary information collected
from all Woredas.4 In selecting the sample tabias, factors that affect socio-
economic conditions such as distance to market, geographical location, the
availability of both rain-fed agriculture and irrigation and size of tabia based
on population were considered. A total of four tabias namely Ruba Feleg,
Tsenkaniet, Arato and Siye were selected for the survey. The tabias selected
are representative of the three agro-ecological zones of the Tigray region
identified on the basis of altitude. Areas with altitude ranging from 1500 to
2300 meters above sea level are locally termed as woina dogua (i.e., midland
areas), areas above 2300 meters above sea level are locally known as dogua
(i.e., highland areas) and areas with altitude less than 1500 meters above sea
level are termed as kola (i.e., lowland). Two of the tabias are in woina dogua,
one is in dogua and the fourth in kola.
A multi-purpose questionnaire was used to gather information on
household income, expenditure, off-farm income, households’ participation
in the FFW and the FSP programs, household assets and local institutions
alongside a host of other information related to production and sales. The
survey questionnaire was administered to 100 households randomly selected
from each tabia. A total of 400 households were selected for the survey. An
important issue for panel data is the attrition rate across rounds. Only nine
households were lost in the second round and six more households in the
third round. The attrition rate over the three years is nearly 4 percent.
Data of the three rounds are directly comparable both in terms of content
and timing. A standardized questionnaire was used in all rounds and the
survey was conducted in a similar season.
3.2 Measuring and Decomposing Poverty
To analyze the impact of the FFW and the FSP programs on chronic and
transitory poverty, we first determine the level of poverty and disaggregate it
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into its transitory and chronic components. We use consumption to measure
poverty, for consumption is generally regarded as the best indicator of welfare
in rural Ethiopia, because most people in the rural areas consume from
their produce and do not earn regular off-farm income. A poverty line is
constructed first by choosing a bundle of food items consumed by the poorest
50 percent. The quantity of each of the food items in the bundle is rescaled
so as to give a predetermined level of minimum calorie requirement—2200
kcal per person per day; this is valued at area-specific prices. The food
component of the poverty line is augmented with an allowance for non-food
goods, consistent with the non-food spending of those households whose
food spending is no more than adequate to afford the food component of the
poverty line.5
Following Jalan and Ravallion (2000), we decomposed poverty into its
chronic and transitory components. They define transient poverty as the
contribution of consumption variability over time to expected consumption.
The non-transient component (chronic poverty) is the poverty that remains
when inter-temporal variability in consumption has been smoothed out (Jalan
and Ravallion, 2000). To formally state, assume consumption is used as
welfare indicator and let (yi1, yi2, . . . , yiT ) be household i’s consumption
stream over T dates and p is some well-defined poverty measure, such
as those in the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke class of poverty measures (Foster
et al., 1984), the inter-temporal aggregate measure of poverty of household
i is:
pi = p(yi1, yi2, . . . , yiT ) (1)
The household’s total poverty pi is the expectation overtime of the poverty
measure at each point in time pit :
pi = 1
T
T∑
t=1
pit (2)
where pit is:
pit =
⎧⎨
⎩
(
z − yit
z
)α
if yit < z
0 if yit ≥ z
(3)
where z is the poverty line. Chronic poverty is the poverty at time mean
consumption for all dates and is defined as:
ci = p(y∗i , y∗i , . . . , y∗i ) (4)
where y∗i is the mean consumption expenditure of household i.
Equation (4) can be written as the expectation over time of the household’s
chronic poverty at each point in time cit , but since the household’s chronic
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poverty does not change over time, ci = cit where:
ci = cit =
⎧⎨
⎩
(
z − y∗i
z
)α
if y∗i < z
0 if y∗i ≥ z
(5)
The transient component (pti ) of p(.) is the portion that is attributable to
inter-temporal variability in consumption and is given by netting out the
chronic component from the aggregate measure.
pti = pi − ci (6)
Jalan and Ravallion employed the squared poverty gap (i.e., α = 2 in
Equations (3) and (5)) as a measure of poverty which satisfies both the
additive assumption—poverty measure should be additive across households
and over time—and transfer axiom—the poverty function should be strictly
decreasing and convex to penalize inequality among the poor. We use the
same poverty measure—the squared poverty gap. Since the squared poverty
gap gives more weight to the poorest of the poor, it serves the purpose of
evaluating the impact of the FFW and the FSP programs as these programs
are basically meant to serve the poorest of the poor.
3.3 The Impact of Intervention Programs upon Chronic
and Transitory Poverty
After decomposing poverty into its chronic and transitory components, we
analyze the impact of the FFW and the FSP programs on these two forms
of poverty. Assessing the impact of any intervention requires making an
inference about the outcomes that would have been observed for program
participants had they not participated.
Let Y 1 be the outcome conditional on participation and Y 0 the outcome
conditional on non-participation, so that the impact of participation in the
program is  = Y1 − Y0. For each household, only Y 1 or Y 0 is observed,
which leads to a missing-data problem. Let D be an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the household works in FFW and 0 otherwise. Similarly D = 1 if
the household is beneficiary of FSP and 0 otherwise. Let Z denote a vector
of observed individual characteristics used as conditioning variables. The
most common evaluation parameter of interest is the average impact of the
treatment on the treated (ATT) given as
ATT = E( | Z , D = 1) = E(Y1 − Y0 | Z , D = 1)
= E(Y1 | Z , D = 1) − E(Y0 | Z , D = 1) (7)
This parameter estimates the average impact among participants. Data
on program participants identify the mean outcome in the treated state
E(Y1 | Z , D = 1). The mean outcome in the non-treated E(Y0 | Z , D = 1)
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is not observed. We estimate the impact of the FFW and the FSP programs on
total, chronic and transitory poverty levels using propensity score matching
as a method of estimating the counterfactual outcome for participants
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
Let P = Pr(D = 1 | Z) denote the probability of participating in the
programs (FFW or FSP), i.e., the propensity score. Propensity score matching
constructs a statistical comparison group by matching observations on FFW
or FSP recipients to non-participants on similar values of P. Propensity score
matching estimators are based on two assumptions:
a) matching assumes that conditional on P, non-participants have the same
mean outcomes as participants would have if they did not receive the
program:
E(Y0 | P, D = 1) = E(Y0 | P, D = 0) = E(Y0 | P)
b) valid matches can be found for each program participants:
P < 1
If assumptions (a) and (b) are satisfied, then, after conditioning on P,
the Y 0 distribution observed for the matched non-participant group can be
substituted for the missing Y 0 distribution for participants. Under these
assumptions, the mean impact of the program is given by
ATT = E(Y1 − Y0| D = 1)
= E(Y1 | D = 1) − EP|D=1{EY (Y0 | D = 1, P)}
= E(Y1 | D = 1) − EP|D=1{EY (Y0 | D = 0, P)} (8)
where the first term on the right-hand side of the last expression can be
estimated from the treatment group and the second term from the mean
outcomes of the matched (on P) comparison groups.
For each program (FFW and FSP), we estimate the propensity score for
participation in the program by a probit model using observable variables
in the panel that include both determinants of participation in the programs
and factors that affect the outcome. We match treatment and comparison
observation using kernel matching. Following Heckman et al. (1997) and
Smith and Todd (2005), the kernel matching estimator takes the form
ATT = 1
n1
∑
i=I1
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Y1i −
∑
j∈I0
Y0 j K
(
Pj − Pi
an
)
∑
k∈I0
K
(
Pk − Pi
an
)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(9)
where as stated above, I 1 is the treatment group of program participants, I 0
is the comparison group of non-participants, K(•) is a kernel function and
an is a bandwidth parameter.
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3.4 Conditioning Variables for Program Participation
The construction of the unobservable counterfactual is the basic dilemma
of impact evaluation. Measuring impact as the difference in mean outcomes
between all households involved in either the FFW or the FSP and those
not involved even controlling for program characteristics, may give a
biased estimate of program impact. This bias arises if there are unobserved
characteristics that affect the probability of participation in the outcome
of interest. Two important sources of this selection bias include targeting
of the program to recipients based on characteristics unobservable to the
researcher and self-selection into the program by eligible recipients (Gilligan
and Hoddinott, 2007).
The propensity score matching estimator used in this analysis helps to
control for these sources of selection bias and provides reliable, low-bias
estimates of program impact provided sufficient control variables relevant
to modeling the program participation decisions are used (Heckman et al.,
1997). Our data set contains a rich set of conditioning variables to control
program participation decisions.
The FFW and the FSP programs are intended to serve the very poor.
Although it is difficult to identify the poor, one way of judging the welfare
level of households is on the basis of assets owned. Hence, we include the
two basic assets in the rural economy—land and livestock owned. Lack of
these assets is associated not only with program eligibility but also with
the outcome variable—total, chronic and transitory poverty measured by the
squared poverty gap. However, the direction of the association of poverty
with assets that can be accumulated or depleted such as livestock is not clear.
It could be that households are poor because they possess less livestock
or households possess less livestock because they are poor. To avoid the
endogeniety problem, we have used lagged values of livestock owned, that
is, livestock owned in 2003, a year before the survey period for which poverty
is calculated.
Demographic variables (female headship, age of household head, number
of adult household members, number of children under five, dependency
ratio and family size) associated with program eligibility and the outcome
variables are also included.
A household participates in these programs with the aim of securing
additional income and/or diversifying its income base by investing in new
activities. Thus, a household’s decision is partly influenced by the available
labor time and the alternative income sources at its disposal. To capture
this effect, we include control variables of whether a household participates
in non-farm wage employment and/or non-farm self-employment income
generating activities. We also include social capital defined by membership
in local institutions to indicate the breadth and depth of household social
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connectedness to identify the role of these connections and access to
information in program participation. Detailed retrospective questions about
shocks in the 2006 round of the socio-economic survey also allows us to
construct control variables for crop loss due to drought, disease and pests;
livestock loss due to animal disease or theft, and other losses such as death
of a household member, serious illness of a member, separation of partners,
judiciary and other problems.
Conceived as willing to improve themselves, local administrators favor
households who prepare their own water wells or garden ponds in the
selection of participants for the FFW and the FSP programs. To capture
this effect, we include control variables on whether a household possesses
its own water well or garden pond.
Besides the above common control variables that influence eligibility to
FFW and FSP, program-specific variables are also included. In the rural areas
of Tigray, households are required to work 20 days for free on communal
activities such as soil and water conservation. Since participation in collective
action is regarded as one of the essential conditions to participate in the
FFW program, we include a control variable to capture whether a household
participated in communal activities in 2004 and 2005. We also include the
gap between the local market wage rate and the FFW wage rate interacted
with male adult household members to identify household specific self
selection.
For the FSP program, we include a control variable for households’
access and indebtedness to other formal sources of credit such as loans
from Dedebit Credit and Saving Institute (DECSI), Bureau of Agriculture,
Women’s Association and Cooperatives is considered. To be eligible to the
FSP program, a household must not be indebted to any of the aforementioned
formal institutions.
With this rich set of control variables one can capture many of
the determinants of participation that are typically unobservable to the
researcher, which helps to reduce a potentially significant source of bias
in propensity score matching estimators. We find that the estimates of the
FFW and the FSP programs are sensitive to the choice of variables used for
conditioning participation, so we try various alternative specifications and
present the results that appear most robust.
4. Results
We present our results by first showing the dynamics of poverty and then
we explore the impact of the FFW and the FSP programs upon chronic and
transitory poverty.
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4.1 Dynamics of Poverty
Short-term Mobility of Households between 2004 and 2006
The mobility of households between quintiles using transition matrix is
shown in Table 1. The ijth element of a transition matrix represents the
percentage of households that moved from state i to state j in the period under
consideration. The table indicates that most households at the two extreme
quintiles—the bottom most (first quintile) and top most (fifth quintile)—
stayed in the same quintile as compared to the middle level quintiles.
Moreover, most households moved one quintile upward or downward.
The information contained in the transition matrix can be summarized into
a mobility index using Shorrocks Mobility Index (SMI). Shorrocks mobility
index, M for a transition matrix T is given by
M(T ) = n − trace T
n − 1 (10)
where n is the number of states or categories.
The index is normalized to take a value between 0 and 1 by dividing it
by n/n – 1. An SMI value close to one indicates higher mobility (Shorrocks,
1978). The transition matrix in Table 1 results in an SMI of 0.696, indicating
relatively high mobility between 2004 and 2006. The index, however, does
not give indication of the direction of mobility. Table 2 provides information
on direction of mobility using the poverty line by dividing households into
three: the poor with consumption below the poverty line (below Z); the
Table 1: Transition matrix for quintiles of real consumption between
2004 and 2006
Quintiles 1 2 3 4 5
1 39 16 22 13 10
2 25 25 17 23 10
3 14 29 22 17 18
4 10 23 20 26 21
5 12 8 19 21 40
Table 2: Transition matrix using poverty line between 2004 and 2006
2006 consumption →
2004 consumption ↓ Below Z Between Z and 2Z Above 2Z
Below Z 212 = 61% 124 = 36% 10 = 3%
Between Z and 2Z 11 = 33% 19 = 58% 3 = 9%
Above 2Z 1 = 17% 3 = 50% 2 = 33%
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Table 3: Poverty transition (2004–2006)
Status (2004 → 2005 → 2006)
P = poor; NP = not poor Frequency Percentage
P → P → P 174 45
P → P → NP 66 17
P → NP → P 38 10
P → NP → NP 68 18
NP → NP → NP 15 4
NP → NP → P 2 1
NP → P → NP 12 3
NP → P → P 10 3
vulnerable with consumption between the poverty line and double this value
(between Z and 2Z), and lastly, the rich with consumption more than twice
the value of the poverty line (above 2Z).
Since most households (nearly 90 percent) were below the poverty line in
2004, it is important to see the movement of these households shown in the
first row of Table 2. Sixty-one percent of the households who were poor in
2004 were also classified poor in 2006. Only 39 percent are able to cross the
poverty line, out of which more than 90 percent are between Z and 2Z and
the remaining 10 percent are above 2Z.
The transition matrices discussed above only consider movements between
the initial year and the last year of the survey ignoring any movement
in between. Table 3 summarizes the movement of households in each of
the three survey years. It indicates that 45 percent of the households were
persistently poor throughout the survey period. The percentage rises to
50 percent if the figure is counted out of those initially observed poor.
It means that one-half of the households observed poor in the initial year of
the survey were not able to come out of poverty either in the following year
or the last year of the survey. The non-poor category (households observed
non-poor throughout the survey) accounts for 4 percent and the remainder
(51 percent) have experienced movements in poverty—some (38 percent)
are escapers and the remainder (13 percent) are entrants.
The Magnitude of Chronic and Transitory Poverty
To examine the nature of poverty further, we calculated total, chronic and
transient poverty using the Jalan and Ravallion measures described above.
The results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 indicates that chronic poverty constitutes 65 percent of the total
poverty and only the remaining 35 percent is transitory. Thus if one is
interested in the poorest of the poor, Table 4 indicates that most of the
squared poverty gap results from low average income levels rather than
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Table 4: Decomposition of total poverty into chronic and transient
poverty
Total Percent Chronic Percent Transient Percent
Full sample 0.157 100 0.102 65 0.055 35
Arato 0.104 100 0.046 44 0.058 56
Rubafeleg 0.162 100 0.122 75 0.04 25
Siye 0.183 100 0.123 67 0.06 33
Tsenkaniet 0.175 100 0.114 65 0.061 35
Table 5: Participation in FFW and FSP programs
Study areas
Arato Rubafeleg Siye Tsenkaniet Full sample
Number of households in the panel
(2004–2006)
92 96 97 100 385
Share of households participating in
the FFW program (2004–2006)
85 85 81 66 80
Average number of days worked in
the FFW program (2004–2006)∗
222 134 234 168 191
Share of households participating in
the FSP program (2004 and 2005)
48 44 51 56 50
∗Average number of days is calculated for those who participated in the FFW program.
fluctuations of income. However, the proportion of chronic and transitory
poverty shows significant variation among the study areas. The proportion of
chronic poverty ranges from 44 percent in Arato to 75 percent in Rubafeleg.
The contribution of chronic to total poverty is higher in northern Ethiopia
as compared to a study made by Swanepoel (2005) for rural Ethiopia using
the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) panel data. Using the same
measure of poverty (α = 2), Swanepoel (2005) finds that chronic poverty
amounts to 49 percent of total poverty in rural Ethiopia. In another study,
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) find a chronic poverty ranging from 75 to
92 percent of the total. However, their result is reported for a poverty gap
measure (α = 1) and it is not directly comparable.
4.2 The Poverty Impact of the FFW and FSP Programs
Participation in the FFW and FSP programs, the dependent variables in the
impact assessment analysis, takes the value of 1 if a household participates in
the programs and 0 otherwise. Table 5 shows a description of participation in
each program. Participation in the FFW program is considered over the whole
panel period (2004–2006); whereas participation in the FSP program is for
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the first two years of the panel (2004 and 2005). In analyzing participation
in the FSP program, the last year of the panel (2006) is not considered
because the welfare impact of loans obtained in 2006 could not be observed
in the same period.
Propensity Score
For both the FFW and the FSP programs, probit models were estimated using
a broad set of control variables to construct propensity scores used to match
program participants to non-participants. In propensity score matching, it is
important to condition the match on variables that are highly associated with
the outcome variables (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). However, as
Smith and Todd (2005) noted, there is little guidance on how to select the set
conditioning variables used to construct the propensity score.
As stated in Section 3.4 above, we focused on finding a set of conditioning
variables that on theoretical grounds and based on information in the survey
data should be highly associated with the probability of participating in each
program and with the outcomes of interest. In a series of t-tests, we tested
the balancing property of each of the probit specifications to ensure that
the mean propensity score is not different for the treatment sample and the
sample of comparison observations at various levels of propensity scores.
Table 6 presents the model of participation in each program used to create
propensity scores for the matching algorithm. For the FSP, the control
variables chosen include land owned, household demographic variables
(female headship, age of household head, family size, number of adult
household members), whether the household head has at least a primary
level of education,6 whether the household experienced reporting crop shock,
livestock shock, and illness shock from 2004 to 2006; the number of livestock
owned in 2003 in tropical livestock units, whether the household possesses
a garden pond and water well, whether the household earns non-farm wage
income, whether the household earns non-farm self-employment income,
whether the household is free of any financial indebtedness to other formal
institutions that provide loans to farmers in the area and finally a household’s
social capital measured by membership in local associations.
For the FFW program, the estimated propensity scores were based on
the same set of control variables used in the FSP except for financial
indebtedness of a household to other formal institutions which is not required
to have access to the FFW program. Two new control variables are added
in estimating propensity scores in the FFW program. One is whether the
household participated in collective work in 2004 and 2005, and the second
is the wage differential between FFW and the local agricultural labour market
interacted with the number of adult male household members.
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Table 6: Probit estimates for participation in FSP and FFW programs
FSPa FFWa
Estimatesb Estimatesb
Variables (βˆ) t-value (βˆ) t-value
Female headship ∓ 0.133 (0.71) 0.020 (0.07)
Age of household head −0.014∗∗∗ (−2.81) −0.015∗∗ (−2.22)
Number of adult household members 0.123∗ (1.70) 0.126 (0.93)
Family size 0.016 (0.34) −0.011 (−0.16)
Dummy for household head education ∓ −0.084 (−1.27) −0.087 (−0.81)
Water well ∓ 0.261 (1.17) 0.371 (1.21)
Garden pond ∓ 0.470∗∗∗ (2.99) 0.322 (1.24)
Social capital 0.015∗∗∗ (3.20) 0.014∗∗ (2.29)
Livestock owned in tropical livestock unit 0.020 (0.71) −0.059 (−1.42)
Non-farm wage income ∓ −0.047 (−0.27) 1.028∗∗∗ (4.17)
Non-farm own business income ∓ 0.137 (0.88) −0.496∗∗ (−1.99)
Crop shock ∓ 0.159 (1.08) −0.599∗∗∗ (−2.65)
Livestock shock ∓ −0.356∗∗ (−2.00) −0.297 (−1.14)
Illness and/or death shock ∓ −0.083 (−0.43) −0.552∗∗ (−2.01)
Land owned (Tsimdi)c 0.004 (0.16) 0.047 (1.09)
Financial indebtedness to formal institutions −0.271∗ (−1.78)
Collective action in 2004 ∓ 0.859∗∗∗ (2.99)
Collective action in 2005 ∓ 0.431∗ (1.84)
Market-FFW wages differential ∗ adult male 0.002 (0.03)
Log likelihood −238.946 −100.410
chi2 55.81 161.24
P 0.000 0.000
Notes:
aDependent variable equals 1 if household participated in the program (worked in FFW program or got loan
from FSP program) between 2004 and 2006 in the case of FFW program and until 2005 for FSP program,
and 0 otherwise.
bResults are presented as the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each continuous X
variable, and as the discrete change in the probability from changing the value from 0 to 1 for dummy X
variables (marked with a ∓). Estimates include village dummy variables (not shown).
cTsimdi is an area of land that can be plowed by a pair of oxen in a day and is approximately equal to
one-fourth of a hectare.
∗Significant at 10% level; ∗∗significant at 5% level; ∗∗∗significant at 1% level.
Matching Results
Table 7 presents estimates of the average impact of participation in the
FFW and the FSP programs. The outcomes considered include total poverty,
chronic poverty and transient poverty. The squared poverty gap is used to
measure all three forms of poverty.
Panel A of Table 7 shows the average level of total, chronic and
transient poverty along with the average differences and t-values for treated
and control groups, where treatment is defined by participation in the
FSP program. The results indicate that participation in the FSP program
significantly affects total and chronic poverty. For the unmatched samples,
the ‘naı¨ve’ estimates of the effect of the FSP program on total poverty
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Table 7: Average outcome of total, chronic and transient poverty
for matched groups of FSP and FFW program participants
and non-participants
Difference
E(Y) E(Y) Non- in average
Outcome Groups participants participants outcome ATT t-value
PANEL A:
Treatment: participation in FSP
Impact: Mean impact
Total poverty Unmatched 0.146 0.168 −0.022∗ (−1.73)
Matched 0.142 0.174 −0.032∗∗∗ (−2.33)
Chronic poverty Unmatched 0.094 0.11 −0.016 (−1.27)
Matched 0.089 0.116 −0.027∗ (−1.94)
Transient poverty Unmatched 0.052 0.058 −0.006 (−1.11)
Matched 0.052 0.058 −0.006 (−0.95)
PANEL B:
Treatment: Participation in FFW program
Impact: Mean impact
Total poverty Unmatched 0.160 0.142 0.018 (1.11)
Matched 0.160 0.123 0.037 (1.04)
Chronic poverty Unmatched 0.105 0.086 0.019 (1.19)
Matched 0.106 0.0.082 0.023 (0.71)
Transient poverty Unmatched 0.055 0.056 −0.001 (−0.16)
Matched 0.055 0.041 0.014 (0.86)
Treatment: participation in FFW program
Impact: Mean impact by tertiles of total poverty measured by squared poverty gap
Total Poverty Matched in tertile 1 0.035 0.060 −0.026∗ −1.80
Matched in tertile 2 0.138 0.164 −0.026 −1.18
Matched in tertile 3 0.290 0.322 −0.032 −1.17
Chronic Poverty Matched in tertile 1 0.008 0.016 −0.008 −0.97
Matched in tertile 2 0.074 0.134 −0.059∗ −1.80
Matched in tertile 3 0.228 0.285 −0.057 −1.12
Transient Poverty Matched in tertile 1 0.027 0.045 −0.018 −1.35
Matched in tertile 2 0.064 0.031 0.033 1.24
Matched in tertile 3 0.062 0.036 0.025 0.67
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
measured by the squared poverty gap is −0.022, meaning that households
who participate in the FSP are expected to have lower total poverty measured
by the poverty gap by 0.022 points, on average, than households who do not
participate in the FSP program. As shown in the table this difference between
the treated (participants in the FSP) and the untreated (non-participants) is
substantial (−0.032) when respondents are matched on household socio-
demographic, asset and other variables indicated in Table 6.
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Participants in the matched sample have poverty levels, measured by the
squared poverty gap, that are on average nearly 18 percent lower than non-
participants in the same sample. This suggests that the FSP program has
a causal influence on total poverty when individuals are matched on the
relevant socio-demographic, assets and other covariates. Hence, if we had
two hypothetical households matched on those socio-demographic, asset and
other variables in Table 6 but were to make one of them participate in the
FSP (i.e., get access to a food security loan for a package of activities and
training) she would have a poverty level on average 18 percent lower than
the other individual not involved in the program.
For chronic poverty, a similar trend is reflected. Treated households in the
matched sample have lower levels of chronic poverty than non-participants
in the same sample. Program participants have a chronic poverty level that is
on average 0.027 points (i.e., 23 percent) lower than non-participants and the
difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance.
On the other hand, for the unmatched sample, the difference in chronic
poverty between participants and non-participants vanishes (p > 0.10).
The third outcome estimated for program participants and non-participants
is transitory poverty. The FSP program has no significant influence on
transient poverty. Although the difference in transitory poverty between
participants and non-participants is negative, it is not statistically significant
and hence not different from zero (p > 0.10).
In panel B, the same analysis of the outcome variables is done, but this
time the treatment variable being whether the household participates in
the FFW program. The results indicate that there is no difference on the
three measures of poverty (total, chronic and transient) for both program
participants and non-participants, suggesting that the FFW program has no
significant influence on chronic and transient poverty as measured by the
squared poverty gap.
In the bottom portion of Table 7, we estimate the impact of FFW on total,
chronic and transient poverty by tertiles of total poverty to see if the average
impact masks significant impacts of the FFW program for some participants.
Lower tertile means households with a low level of total poverty and hence
higher welfare, and higher tertile means lower welfare. The estimates show
variation in the impact of participation in the FFW program across the three
forms of poverty. Participants and non-participants are not different in terms
of transient poverty but there are significant differences in total and chronic
poverty for tertiles one and two respectively. Participants in tertile 1 (the
tertile with the lowest level of poverty or equally, the tertile with the highest
level of welfare) have a lower level of total poverty than non-participants
in the same tertile. This means that the FFW program reduces severity of
poverty for participants in the upper welfare group. The same effect, however,
is not observed for the second and the third tertiles. The difference in total
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poverty among participants and non-participants in these two tertiles is not
different from zero (p > 0.10). On the other hand, participants in the second
tertile have lower levels of chronic poverty than non-participants in the same
tertile. The difference in chronic poverty for the other tertiles, although
negative, is not statistically significant (p > 0.10).
To sum up, the FFW program has a significant and negative effect on total
and chronic poverty for the richest and the middle tertiles respectively, but is
not significant for the poorest tertile. This echoes the finding by Gilligan and
Hoddinott (2007) in their analysis of the impact of Employment Generation
Schemes (EGS) on household welfare in Ethiopia. They find that the EGS
program has no effect on the growth of household consumption or food
consumption for households in the poorest tertile, but it has large, positive
and significant effects on both outcomes of households in tertiles 2 and
3 (Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007). One explanation given by Gilligan and
Hoddinott (2007) is the difference in the number of days worked. EGS
participants in the poorest tertile worked fewer days on average than their
counterparts in the second and third tertiles.
A similar explanation holds true in this analysis too. The FFW participants
in the richest tertile (tertile 1) worked on average more days than their
counterparts in the second and third tertiles. Program participants in tertile
one worked on average 194.3 days over the period 2004–2006, while those
in the second and third tertiles worked 189.6 and 189.5 days respectively
over the same period. The difference is even larger if we consider the
average number of days worked per adult household member or average
per capita number of days worked (i.e., total number of days worked by a
household divided by household size). The FFW participants in the richest
tertile worked on average 93 days per adult household member, whereas
the figure for program participants in the middle and the poorest tertiles is
75.9 and 73.5 days respectively. Similarly in terms of per capita number of
days worked, program participants in the richest, middle and poorest tertiles
worked 45.6, 31.4 and 31 days respectively. In all indicators, participants in
the richest tertile participate more in the program followed by participants
in the middle tertile. One reason for this observed difference in participation
may be the tighter labor constraint in poor households (Barrett and Clay,
2003; Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007). Another reason could be poor targeting
in the implementation of the program. Although it is believed that the FFW
program is self-targeted, that is, the relatively wealthier households are less
likely to participate due to the low wage, there is evidence that this is not
the case. Solomon (2006) finds that households with higher farm income
and oxen holding were more likely to take part in food-for-work programs
in northern Ethiopia pointing to a leakage in targeting.
Besides differences in number of days worked, another explanation for
differences in impact of the FFW on poverty for the three tertiles could be
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that due to factors not explained by the substantial set of control variables
used for matching participants to non-participants, the rich can complement
income from the FFW by other sources and turn it to a more productive use
and hence more lasting effects on poverty.
5. Conclusions
Using panel data of 385 rural households from the Tigray region of northern
Ethiopia, we examined the dynamics of poverty and the impact of the FFW
and the FSP programs on total, chronic and transitory poverty.
Poverty in Tigray is predominantly chronic. Matching results indicate
that the FSP program significantly reduces total and chronic poverty. After
matching participants in the FSP program with non-participants on the basis
of some socio-demographic, asset and other variables, we find that the level
of total and chronic poverty of the FSP program participants is respectively
18 and 23 percent lower than that of non-participants. The two groups,
however, do not differ in terms of transitory poverty.
Participation in the FFW program, on the other hand, does not have
a strong and significant effect on chronic and transitory poverty. Results
disaggregated by tertiles of total poverty measured by the squared poverty
gap show that benefits from the FFW program are skewed towards
households in the richest and the middle tertiles.
These findings have important implications for anti-poverty measures.
The predominantly chronic nature of poverty in our sample implies two
things: (a) anti-poverty measures should place emphasis on building the
asset base of the poor to shift average income. The recent shift in the FFW
program from a relief-oriented emergency system to the Productive Safety
Net Program (PSNP) that targets to provide long-term predictable support to
chronic food insecure households is commendable, and (b) the fact that most
poverty is chronic makes targeting possible. Despite this, targeting seems a
problem in the anti-poverty measures especially in the FFW. The relatively
rich households benefit more than the severely poor.
Notes
1. FFW includes all public work programs made against payment either
in kind or in cash and the recently introduced Production Safety Net
Program (PSNP).
2. ETB is Ethiopian Birr, the local currency. The exchange rate in August
2008 was US$1 = ETB9.6571.
3. A tabia is the smallest unit of local government in rural communities of
the present day Tigray and each tabia consists of four villages. Hence,
the study is conducted in 16 villages.
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4. A Woreda is the second administrative unit above the tabia.
5. From the survey data a poverty line of ETB1008 per person per year
is constructed. The poverty line is constructed by first identifying the
poorest 50 percent as a reference household deemed to be typical of
the poor. Next, we identified the food items commonly consumed by
the reference household to constitute the food bundle. In this case, a
total of 21 food items are chosen and their quantity is determined in
such a way that the bundle supplies a predetermined level of minimum
calorie requirement—2200 kcal. Having selected the bundle of goods,
we then valued it using a median price for each food item in the
basket based on internal price data. The same basket of food items is
valued by the corresponding price in each year and each study site to
determine the cost of consuming the reference basket of food items. We
expressed consumption expenditure in terms of 2006 prices. We followed
the approach described in Ravallion and Bidani (1994) to estimate the
required non-food share by examining the consumption behavior of the
reference household who can just afford the reference food bundle.
The non-food share is estimated by regressing the share of total
expenditure devoted to food of each household i on a constant and the log
of the ratio of consumption expenditures to the food poverty line
si = α + β log(yi/z f ) + εi
where the value of the intercept α estimates the average food share of those
households that can just afford the food bundle, i.e., those households
whose expenditure equals the food poverty line (yi = z f ). The poverty
line is given by: z = z f (2 − α).
6. One can consider the primary level, secondary level and tertiary level
education complete separately as control variables in each program used
to create propensity scores for the matching algorithm. However, past
educational investment of the present adult force in the sample is very
small. There are no households with tertiary education and households
with secondary education are few in number. Hence we considered only
one variable for education (at least primary level complete).
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